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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States*
I. hNTRODUCTION
As the frequency and volume of international trade increases to historic
proportions, 1 so does the possibility of conflict between parties involved in
international transactions. The logical relationship between an increase in
trade and a concomitant increase in trade disputes has led to a continuous
search for more effective ways to resolve private international disputes, and
it has influenced the development of much of current international trade law.2
Throughout the years, parties to international transactions have responded to
the need to resolve disputes efficiently by developing comprehensive dispute
resolutions systems.3
Meanwhile, individual countries and multinational organizations have
attempted to complement private dispute resolution systems with
international treaty law that encourages efficient dispute settlement. One
such treaty is the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York
Convention (the "New York Convention").4 By making valid foreign arbitral
* 195 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1999)
For example, the combined value of goods imported into and exported from the
United States alone has risen from $106.9 billion in 1972 to $1.72 trillion in 1999-an
increase of nearly 1,600%. See International Trade Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S.
Trade in Goods, 1972-1999 (visited March 28, 2000) <http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/tdl
industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/H99t03.txt>.
2 See Malcolm R. Wilkey, Introduction to Dispute Settlement in International Trade
and Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 613, 613 (1995) (noting that
the "explosion" in the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the international
sphere is "an inevitable result of [an] increase in trade").
3 Indeed, private ADR methods such as arbitration have been used by parties for
centuries as an impartial and authoritative resource for resolving trading disputes. See,
e.g., Michael Hoellering, Alternative Dispute Resolution and International Trade, 14
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 785, 785 (1986). In particular, arbitration has proven to
be helpful in resolving disputes in cases for which there is no other impartial forum
available. See Michael Hoellering, World Trade: To Arbitrate or Mediate-That Is the
Question, DisP. RESOL. J., Mar. 1994, at 67, 67. For an analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages of international arbitration, see id.
4 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The
United States acceded to the New York Convention in 1970 with the passage of the 1970
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994), and the Convention is codified in Title
9 of the United States Code. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1994).
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awards enforceable in the domestic legal systems of all of its signatories,5 the
New York Convention was an important step in international alternative
dispute resolution (ADR), and it significantly increased the attractiveness of
arbitration as a means of settling international disputes. 6
Despite the development of institutions and legal norms such as the New
York Convention to help resolve international commercial disputes, the legal
environment in which a business must operate remains somewhat precarious.
Increased trade and trade-related disputes often create unique problems for
participants in international transactions, who many times must venture into
unchartered legal waters. Additionally, the domestic legal systems that are
called to resolve issues associated with international trade are often faced
with situations involving the complex interaction of domestic and
international laws. In many instances, the domestic legal system that a court
must use as a backdrop to resolve an issue is ill-suited to deal with particular
legal problems. Quite simply, the law in many cases does not anticipate
several of the situations courts are now called on to address.
Fortunately, domestic legal systems increasingly are developing coherent
law to address international transactions and the legal issues attendant to
them. 7 Additionally, domestic legal systems are becoming more adept at
applying national law to situations that arise from international transactions.
Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States8 is one example of a
domestic court effectively applying domestic law to a situation born from an
international transaction and a dispute that resulted from it. The result of this
effort is that domestic tax law is made clearer, and a hallmark of international
dispute settlement, arbitration, is made slightly more attractive to American
corporations.
5 Article HI of the Convention provides in pertinent part that "[e]ach Contracting
State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them .... There shall not be
imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards . . . ." New York Convention art. I,
supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40.
6 See Jessica Thorpe, A Question of Intent: Choice of Law and the International
Arbitration Agreement, Disp. RESOL. J., Nov. 1999, at 17, 21.
7 See, e.g., Jonathan Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and International
Law, COLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 65, 67 (1997) ("International tribunals do provide
valuable interpretations of international law, but it is the states that play the predominant
role in creating and modifying its norms.").
8 195 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1999).
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts in Schlumberger involve a complex series of transactions and
legal proceedings that culminate in a dispute between an American
corporation and the Internal Revenue Service. For convenience and clarity,
this Note first discusses the underlying international transaction that gave rise
to the eventual tax dispute. It then addresses the circumstances that directly
led up to the tax dispute involved in the case.
A. The Underlying Dispute
In 1966, Sedco, Inc. (Sedco), a Texas Corporation, entered into a joint
venture agreement with Sonatrach, a company entirely owned by the
Algerian government. 9 According to the terms of the joint venture
agreement, the two companies formed a third company to explore oil and gas
deposits. 10 Sedco owned a forty-nine percent interest in newly formed
company, and Sonatrach retained a fifty-one percent majority interest.11 The
joint venture agreement also required that all disputes between the parties be
submitted to binding arbitration before a Swiss tribunal.12
In 1981, Sedco claimed that Sonatrach was using its majority power in
the exploration company to deprive Sedco of the value of its stock in the
venture.13 Pursuant to the joint venture agreement, Sedco submitted its
claims to a Swiss tribunal in February 1981.14 Shortly after Sedco submitted
the matter to arbitration, Sonatrach began liquidating the exploration
venture.15 At this point, the conflict intensified as Sonatrach claimed that
Sedco was entitled only to receive $2.6 million from the liquidation of the
company's assets. 16 Sedco disputed this sum, referred to by the United States
District Court for the Southern District Court of Texas as the "Stated
9 See id. at 217. "Sonatrach" is an abbreviated name for the Soci&6t Nationale de
Transport et de Conmercialisation des Hydrocarbons. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v.
United States, No. CIV. A. H-96-0259, 1998 WL 919867, at *2 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
10 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 217.
11 See id
12See id.
13 See id.
14 See id.; see also Schlumberger, 1998 WL 919867, at *2.
15 See Schlumberger, 1998 WL 919867, at *2.
16 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 217. The record indicates that Sonatrach refused to
pay this so-called "Stated Liquidation Amounf' despite Sedco's repeated requests. See
Schlumberger, 1998 WL 919867, at *2.
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Liquidation Amount,"'17 and submitted the additional matter of liquidation
compensation to the tribunal.1 8
In February 1984, the Swiss tribunal rendered a decision in favor of
Sedco and ordered that Sonatrach pay Sedco approximately $26 million. 19
Sonatrach subsequently appealed the arbitral decision to a Swiss appellate
court, which granted a temporary stay of the award in April of 1984.20 In
May and June of 1994, the Swiss appellate court revoked the stay and
rejected Sonatrach's request that the award be nullified, respectively. 21
On September 7, 1984, with the Swiss arbitral panel's decision in hand,
Sedo sought to enforce the award in the French Tribunal de Grand Instance.22
Sedco chose France as a suitable place to enforce the arbitral award because
Sonatrach owned significant assets in the country that could be attached to
enforce Sonatrach's obligation.23 Pursuant to its domestic legal procedures,
the French Tribunal granted Sedco an enforcement order, called an exequatur
in French, on September 19, 1984. 24 The exequatur was provisional to the
extent that it was subject to specific recognized defenses25 that Sonatrach
could assert by requesting an appeal within three months of its notification
that the exequatur was granted. 26
In October 1994, Sedco requested and was granted the right to begin
attachment proceedings against Sonatrach's French assets.27 According to
French procedures, attachment, called saisie-arrt, is carried out in two
distinct phases.28 In stage one, a garnishor-in this case Sedco-attaches
assets held by domestic garnishees. 29 In stage two, which is analogous to the
American process of execution on assets, the garnishor seeks to have its
17 See Schlumberger, 1998 WL 919867, at *7.
18 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 217.
19 See id. at 217.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See Schlumberger, 1998 WL 919867, at *3.
23 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 217. Prior to seeking enforcement of the decision
in France, Sedco informed Sonatrach that the deadline for an appeal of the Swiss court's
decision had expired and requested that Sonatrach voluntarily comply with the arbitral
award. See id.
24 See id. at 217.
25 See id. at 217-18. For a discussion of these defenses, see infra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text.
26 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 218.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id. In this case, the garnishee was Gaz de France, which had at its disposal
enough of Sonatrach's assets to satisfy the arbitral award. See id.
[Vol. 15:3 2000]
SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORP. V. UNITED STATES
attachment validated by the appropriate French court, which then will direct
the garnishee to pay to the garnishor the assets attached. 30 The second phase
is contingent upon a lapse of the time in which to appeal the exequatur and
an actual affirmation of the exequatur order.31
On December 11, 1984,32 before the saisie-arrat proceedings had
concluded, Sedco and Sonatrach reached a tentative compromise
agreement.33 The agreement then was sent to the Algerian authorities for
approval, and a settlement was finalized in 1985. 34
B. Dispute over the Recognition of Taxable Income
Although rooted in the above transaction, the operative facts of
Schlumberger begin on December 24, 1984, when Sedco merged into
Schlumberger Technology Corporation (Schlumberger). 35 As a result of the
merger, Sedco's final fiscal year for tax purposes ended on December 24,
1984.36 When it filed its final income tax return, Sedco failed to include the
$26 million Swiss arbitral award in its computation of taxable income.37
Following a 1989 audit, the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") issued
a report in which it stated that, as a result of failing to include the arbitral
award in its 1984 consolidated return, Sedco underreported its gross income
by $27,175,581. 38 As a result of this alleged error, the Service imposed a tax
deficiency and a substantial penalty for understatement of income.39 Sedco
30 See id.
31 See id Of course, an appeal of an exequatur can be denied explicitly and
immediately, in which case a gamishor need not wait until the time for appeal has
elapsed. See id.
32 There is a discrepancy in the record regarding when the parties actually reached a
tentative settlement agreement. The district court opinion states that the agreement was
reached on December, 14, 1984, see Schlumberger, 1998 WL 919867, at *4, while the
Fifth Circuit's opinion states that the agreement came on December 11, 1984, see
Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 218.
33 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 218.
34 See Schlumberger, 1998 WL 919867, at *4. Sonatrach began making payments on
the settlement agreement to Sedco on April 1, 1985. See id.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id. According to the Service, Sedco failed to report the following amounts in
gross income: $24,382,332 in capital gain income, $1,996,408 in interest income, and
$796,841 in ordinary income. See id.
39 See id. The tax deficiency is not stated in the record, but the understatement
penalty assessed was $1,363,082.
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(or Schlumberger as it was known after the merger) timely paid the
deficiency and penalty, and it initiated the principal suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas to seek a refund of all taxes
and penalties paid as a result of the 1989 audit report.40
In the district court, Schlumberger moved for partial summary judgment
on the issue of its liability for the payment of additional taxes and penalties. 41
The Service likewise submitted a cross-motion for summary judgment on the
issue of liability.42 Upon entertaining both parties' motions, the district court
granted Schlumberger's motion and held that it was not required to report as
taxable income the arbitral award.43
On appeal, the United States of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court opinion for the reasons set forth below in Part Ill of this Note. 44
I. THE FIFtH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit's opinion is based on accepted American tax principles.
Nonetheless, the particular facts of this case required the court to assess the
effects of international law. Namely, the court was required to determine
whether a foreign arbitral award, the enforcement of which was sought in a
country that has signed the New York Convention, created income in an
American beneficiary of the award when the beneficiary uses the accrual
method of tax accounting.
This Part of the Note first will examine the accrual method of tax
accounting as it comes to bear in the Schlumberger opinion. It then will
discuss the New York Convention and its implications on the realization of
income under American tax law.
A. The Accrual Method of Tax Accounting and the "All Events Test"
The parties in Schlumberger appeared to be in agreement over the nature
of the tax law that was applicable in the case. Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit
4 0 See id.
41 See id. at *1.
42 See id.
43 See id. at *8. The district court also held that Schlumberger was not required to
report as income the $2.6 million figure (the "Stated Liquidation Amount") Sonatarch
originally offered Sedco when the former liquidated the exploration venture in 1981. See
id. at *7.
44 See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States, 195 F.3d 216, 219-21 (5th Cir.
1999). The circuit court does not seem to have addressed the issue of whether the "Stated
Liquidation Amount" was includable as gross income in Sedco's 1984 return. See icL
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noted, "[t]he law in this case is easy to state."45 Under the well accepted "all
events test," an accrual method taxpayer46 such as Schlumberger is required
to report income "in the taxable year in which the last event occurs which
unconditionally fixes the right to receive income and there is a reasonable
expectancy that the right will be converted to money."47
Furthermore, the court noted, both the Service and Schlumberger
accepted the proposition that domestic American judgments constitute a
fixed right to receive income for accrual method purposes despite the
availability of collateral attack by the potential obligor of the judgment. 48
Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed below, the court found that foreign
arbitral awards were sufficiently distinguishable from domestic judgments to
cause the all events test to fail in cases in which a final, valid, and
enforceable arbitral decision has been rendered.49
B. Arbitral Awards and the New York Convention
In Schlumberger, the Service argued that Sedco was required to include
in gross income the amount of the arbitral award as soon as it received a final
and unappealable judgment from the Swiss tribunal.50 Specifically, by
presenting expert testimony that there was no possible legal or factual basis
for Sonatrach to contest Sedco's attachment of its French assets, the Service
contended that the Swiss arbitral award unconditionally fixed Sedco's right
to receive the full amount of the award.51
45 Id. at 219.
46 Under the Internal Revenue Code, taxpayers generally may choose the manner in
which they report income received and outlays for which tax deductions are sought based
on the normal business accounting method the firm uses. See I.R.C. § 446(a) (1994). The
most common methods chosen by taxpayers are either the so-called cash method or the
accrual method, both of which are permitted by I.R.C. § 446(c). Under the cash method,
the taxpayer reports income when it is actually or constructively received. See Gordon T.
Butler, Economic Benefit: Formulating a Workable Theory of Income Recognition, 27
SETON HALL L. RaV. 70, 71 (1996). Although many taxpayers choose to use the cash
method because of its simplicity, see id., the Code limits the use of the cash method for
many taxpayers. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 448(a)(1) (1994) (forbidding the use of the cash
method for all C corporations).
47 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 219 (emphasis added); see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.451-1(a) (1994).
48 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 219.
49 See i& at 221.
50 See id at 219.
51 See id. at 218.
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Schlumberger, on the other hand, argued that the all events test was not
satisfied until it had a right to enforce the award in France by seizing
Sonatrach's assets. 52 In other words, Schlumberger contended that income
from the arbitral award did not accrue until the expiration of Sonatrach's
right to appeal the French exequatur order.53 Schlumberger supported its
position by noting that the enforcement of the award could have been
defeated if Sonatrach raised one of the defenses recognized by the New York
Convention.54
The Fifth Circuit resolved this dispute by conducting a comparison of
domestic judgments and foreign arbitral awards. 55 According to the court,
there were three compelling differences between a domestic judgment and a
foreign arbitral award that required that the receipt of the latter not be
classified as satisfying the all events test.
First, the court noted that unlike a domestic judgment, an arbitral award
must undergo a confirmation and enforcement procedure.56 Such procedures
are subject to the defenses provided for in the New York Convention.57 In
particular, the court noted that Article V of the Convention allows states to
refuse to recognize or enforce foreign arbitral awards if the party against
whom enforcement is sought proves that one of the following conditions
applies: (1) the parties to the arbitration were in some way incapacitated, (2)
the agreement to arbitrate is not valid under the laws of jurisdiction to which
the parties have subjected themselves (i.e., it is illegal), (3) there was a lack
of due process in the arbitration proceeding, (4) the award deals with matters
52 See id. at 219.
53 See id. The timing of the expiration of Sonatrach's right to appeal the exequatur
order, namely three months after Sonatrach was notified of its issuance, see supra note 25
and accompanying text, was an important consideration in this case, as Sedco received
notice that the order was granted on September 26, 1984 and merged with Schlumberger
on December 24, 1984, see Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 218.
Thus, the earliest possible deadline for Sonatrach's appeal-and the earliest date at
which the all events test would have been met-was December 26, 1984, two days after
Sedco's merger and the corresponding end to its tax year.
54 See id. at 218-19. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of defenses under the New York Convention.
55 Although it is not clear from the record, the court's analysis indicates that the
Service may have sought to draw an analogy between foreign arbitral awards and
domestic judgments whose enforcement is sought in an American jurisdiction other than
that which granted the award. By drawing this analogy, it appears that the Service
attempted to bring foreign arbitral awards into the well-accepted legal position that
domestic judgments are considered to satisfy the all events test. See discussion
accompanying note 48, supra.
56 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 219-20.
57 See id.
890
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that are outside those contemplated in the agreement to arbitrate, (5) the
composition of the arbitration panel was not in accordance with the
agreement to arbitrate or the law controlling the arbitration, and (6) the
arbitral award is not yet binding on the parties or has been suspended by a
competent authority.58
Additionally, the court stated that the New York Convention subjected
foreign arbitral awards to defenses based on the domestic law of the state in
which enforcement is sought.59 Specifically, the New York Convention
allows a state to refuse to recognize an arbitral award if the dispute is not
capable of settlement under the laws of the enforcing state or if enforcement
of the award would violate the public policy of the enforcing state.60 The
court reasoned that these additional defenses separated foreign arbitral
awards from domestic American judgments that, although subject to attack
on collateral grounds, enjoy the benefit of the U.S. Constitution's full faith
and credit clause and thus must be given the same effect as they would have
in the state rendering the award regardless of any legal impediment.61
Secondly, the court noted that foreign arbitral awards are distinct from
domestic judgments in that they are not self-executing but must instead be
enforced through a separate judicial proceeding. 62 While recognizing that
even domestic judgments sought to be enforced in the jurisdiction granting
the award are not self-executing in the strict sense of the word, the court
reasoned that the additional requirement of judicial confirmation-as
opposed to automatic execution by nonjudicial means-created an additional
enforcement step.63 This additional step, the court continued, meant that it
made "little sense to say a right to receive exists before the ability to execute
on a judgment is granted."64
58 See id. at 217; see also New York Convention art. V, supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at
2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40, 42 (providing the full text of these defenses).
59 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 220.
60 See id. at 217, 219-20; see also New York Convention art. V, supra note 4, 21
U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40,42 (providing the full text of these defenses).
61 See Schlumberger, 195 F.3d at 220.
62 See id&
63 See id.
64 Id While the court's analysis on this point is not particularly clear, it seems that it
is attempting to say that unlike domestic judgments that may be enforced immediately
after they are rendered, foreign arbitral awards are subject to judicial confirmation first,
before the issue of enforceability even arises. Evidently, this additional step occurs when
the court chooses to draw the line for purposes of deciding whether the all events test has
been met. See id. at 221 ("Given that some line must be drawn, it makes sense to draw
the line between a private arbitration award and a judicially enforceable order, even if the
former flows almost always into the latter.").
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Finally, and in the court's words, "most importantly", the court states
that an arbitral award "has no legal effect without a stamp of judicial
approval. '65 Thus, an arbitral award is uncertain and imparts no rights on the
beneficiary until it receives the coercive power of a judicial proceeding.66
In concluding, the Schlumberger court refused to accept the Service's
recommendation that it extend caselaw allowing the all events test to apply to
expectations of payment that are legally unenforceable to the principal
case.67 According to the court, the cases cited by the Service to support its
position68 deal primarily with undisputed debts that were routinely paid
despite the fact that they were legally unenforceable. 69 Consequently, the
court instead decided to follow the general position that "taxpayers do not
have to accrue disputed debts until the dispute is resolved." 70
IV. CONCLUSION
It is worth noting that the Schlumberger decision appears to be one of
first impression. As such, the decision has the obvious benefit of rendering
the law more definite as it relates to the effect of international arbitration on
American income tax law. This is no small matter when one considers that
the plaintiff in this case, which most likely acted in good faith when failing to
report the value of the arbitral award in its 1984 tax return, was faced with a
significant tax liability.71
Additionally, the court's opinion adopts a commonsense position
regarding the application of international arbitration principles to domestic
tax law. In this fashion, the decision in Schlumberger also contributes in a
relatively small way to the attractiveness of arbitration as a means for settling
international disputes-at least as far as American companies are concerned.
65 Id. at 220.
66 See id. (quoting Michael H. Strub, Jr., Note, Resisting Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards Under Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention: A Proposal for
Effective Guidelines, 68 Tx. L. REv. 1031, 1044 (1990)).
67 See id.(citing Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.
1982); Travis v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1969); Barker v. Macgruder, 95
F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 252 (Ct. Cl.
1976)).
68 See id. for a list of the cases presented by the Service to support its position.
69 See id.
70 Id. (citations omitted).
71 In addition to the $1,363,082 understatement penalty imposed by the Service,
Schlumberger likely faced a 35% tax on the alleged deficiency, which totaled
$27,175,581. See I.R.C. § 11 (b)(1)(C) (1994) (assessing a 35% marginal tax rate on
taxable income greater than $10,000,000).
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If American companies using the accrual method know that they will not be
taxed on arbitral awards until final enforcement proceedings have been taken,
they may be less likely to postpone the initiation of arbitration as a way
beneficially to structure their tax liability.
As international trade inevitably increases, there no doubt will continue
to be more cases like Schlumberger in which domestic courts are called upon
to clarify the effect of international law and legal principles to well-accepted
domestic legal concepts. While this process will continue to be difficult and
often will involve cases of first impression, it is a necessary step for the
development of domestic law in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, the
process is essential if businesses are to be able to operate in a legal climate
that is relatively certain and free from costly mistakes lurking in shadows
created by underdeveloped legal systems. In the end, decisions like
Schlumberger are well worth the intellectual effort they require.
Craig M. Bryson

